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Experiences, causes, and measures to tackle institutional incongruence and 
informal economic activity in South-East Europe 
 
Abstract 
To explain the prevalence and persistence of informal economic activity globally, scholars have 
recently advanced an institutional incongruence perspective. Institutional incongruence exists 
where there is a misalignment between what is considered legitimate by D VRFLHW\¶V IRUPDO
institutions (e.g. its laws and regulations) and its informal institutions (e.g. norms, values and 
beliefs). Reporting findings from a series of qualitative focus groups in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this paper explores relationships between such 
institutional incongruence and informal economic activity. In particular, it sheds light on how 
informality and institutional incongruence are experienced by individuals in South-East Europe. 
It furthermore provides insights on the causes of such incongruence, and how it can lead to 
informal economic activity. Finally, it reports on LQGLYLGXDOV¶ perceptions towards different 
measures to tackle institutional incongruence and informal economic activity, with implications 
for policy makers in South-East Europe and more widely.  
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Introduction 
It is estimated that around a quarter of economic activity across South-East Europe occurs in 
the informal economy (Schneider and Williams 2013). This represents a major policy challenge 
for governments in the region, who are deprived of tax revenues needed for national socio-
economic development (Williams et al 2015a). Increasingly, WKH FRQFHSW RI µLQVWLWXWLRQDO
LQFRQJUXHQFH¶ :HEEHWDO) has been advanced to explain the prevalence of informal 
economic practices globally. Such incongruence exists where there is a misalignment between 
what is considered legitimate by DVRFLHW\¶VIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVHJLWVODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV
and its informal institutions (e.g. norms, values and beliefs). Extant quantitative studies have 
found a statistical association between institutional incongruence and informal economic 
activity (see Williams and Horodnic, 2015). Yet how such incongruence is experienced by 
individuals, at a more micro every day level, has yet to receive significant attention.      
This paper advances our understanding of institutional incongruence as an explanation for 
informal economic activity. It provides a richer, more in-depth and variegated understanding 
of how institutional incongruence is experienced by individuals in South-East Europe, what 
the causes of such incongruence are, and of the dynamics of relationships between institutional 
incongruence and informal economic activity. Furthermore, it provides insights on how 
individuals in South-East Europe perceive existing and potential measures to tackle 
institutional incongruence. To do this it draws upon qualitative focus group research 
undertaken in Bulgaria, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
in 2016.   
In this paper, three research questions are answered: How are informal economic activity and 
institutional incongruence experienced by individuals in South-East European settings? What 
are the causes of institutional incongruence in these settings? How are measures to tackle 
institutional incongruence and informal economic perceived by individuals in South-East 
European settings? An institutional perspective provides the guiding theoretical framework for 
this paper.   
This paper contributes to knowledge in several ways. First, it provides insights on how 
institutional incongruence and its relationship with informal economic activity is experienced 
by individuals in South-East Europe. To date, much of the research examining institutional 
incongruence and informal economic activity has been quantitative, and focussed at a macro 
country level (Williams and Horodnic, 2015). Scholars have identified a need for more fine-
grained micro level research into the informal economy (Webb et al, 2013). As well as for 
studies using alternative research methodologies, e.g. focus groups (see Godfrey, 2011). This 
paper engages with both of these issues. Secondly, this research not only demonstrates the 
existence and significance of institutional incongruence but also sheds light on its causes. 
Thirdly, this paper responds to calls for cross-country research on informal economic activity 
(Williams and Horodnic, 2015), and institutional incongruence more specifically. Our findings 
elaborate a richer understanding of this phenomenon than would be possible using single 
country data. Finally, our findings provide insights for policy makers. They shed light on how 
different measures to tackle institutional incongruence and informal economic activity are 
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perceived by individuals across three counties, including identification of challenges to be 
overcome and their limitations. In so doing, it contributes to wider policy debates outlined for 
the European Union (Williams and Horodnic, 2016).  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review existing literature on the informal economy, 
especially from an institutional perspective. Next, we explore extant research on the informal 
economy in South-East Europe, and policy measures to tackle informal economic activity. The 
research methodology is then presented. This is followed by discussion of individuals¶ 
experiences of informality and institutional incongruence, analysis of the causes of institutional 
incongruence, and assessment of how measures to tackle institutional incongruence and 
informal economic activity are perceived by individuals in South-East Europe. The paper 
concludes with discussion of its contributions, its policy implications, and areas for future 
study.  
 
Literature review  
Informal economic activity an institutional perspective 
The informal economy is a persistent and expanding part of the global economy (Schneider 
and Williams, 2013). Reflecting this, there now exists an extensive body of literature, from 
varied disciplines, examining informal economy phenomena. This includes work in economics 
(Johnson et al, 2000), management (Godfrey, 2015; Webb, 2009) and sociology (Barsoum, 
2015; Samson, 2016). Across these disciplines, the subject of motivations for informality has 
now received significant attention (see for example Schenider and Williams, 2013; Snyder, 
2004; Webb et al 2009; 2013). In particular, scholarly debate has focussed on whether informal 
economic activity is a result of µPDUJLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ and the µexclusion¶ of individuals from the 
formal economy (see Barbour and Llanes, 2013; Cortes, 1997) , or is the result of a more 
voluntary µH[LW¶ (Snyder, 2004). Significantly, recent work has found support for both 
explanations ± with their importance contingent on individual factors like gender, class, age 
etc. (Jones et al, 2006; Littlewood et al 2018; Williams and Horodnic, 2016).  
This work on motivations for informality, and indeed wider informal economy scholarship, has 
recently taken an institutional turn (see Webb et al, 2009, Welter and Smallbone, 2011; 
Williams et al 2015), with scholars increasingly applying institutional concepts and theory to 
explain informal economic activity. Examples of such work include Uzo and Mair (2014) who 
examine informal rule adoption in the Nigerian film industry, Williams et al (2016) who assess 
through an institutional lens the impact of starting up unregistered on firm performance, whilst 
Tonoyan et al (2010) explore the determinants of corruption in transition economies linked to 
country-specific institutional configurations. Finally, Schindler (2016) examine relationships 
between middle class residents and informal workers in Delhi, India, reflecting on the 
regulation of informal working and processes of legitimation and institutionalisation.  
This overall institutional turn in informal economy scholarship LV DSSDUHQW LQ:HEEHW DO¶V
(2013: 599) definition of the informal economy as ³HFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVWKDWRFFXUs outside of 
formal institutional boundaries but which remain within informal institutional boundaries for 
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large soFLHWDOJURXSV´. We adopt this as a working definition of informal economic activity in 
this paper, as it aligns with the overarching institutional perspective we deploy.  
Our paper contributes to this burgeoning body of literature deploying institutional perspectives 
to study and explain informal economy phenomena. More specifically, in this paper we draw 
upon neo-institutional theory, particularly from a sociological perspective, which is founded 
on the notion that organisations, groups and individuals, and their behaviours, are shaped by 
their institutional environments (Scott, 2001). According to Scott (2001) such institutional 
environments comprise three components, or pillars. The regulatory pillar involves formalised 
rules, laws and associated sanctions promoting certain behaviours and restricting others. In the 
context of this paper, this regulatory pillar relates to formalised rules about for example the 
payment of taxation, declaration of work, terms of employment etc. The second normative 
pillar refers to the wider norms and values present in a society about what constitutes 
appropriate and acceptable behaviour. In this research, these would pertain to attitudes towards 
informal economic activity (i.e. the social acceptability of evading tax, working informally, or 
purchasing informal goods and services). The final cultural-cognitive pillar relates to how 
certain behaviours become taken-for-granted based on shared understandings. In this research 
this might relate to how informal activities are enacted unthinkingly, for instance routine 
purchasing from an informal vendor, or individuals not expecting or asking for receipts. 
Institutional theory posits that organisations, groups and individuals behave in ways, which 
reflect regulatory, normative and cognitive conditions in their institutional environments. 
Adherence to these rules ensures legitimacy. In the regulatory pillar, this legitimacy is gained 
through compliance with legal requirements, in the normative pillar it is based on moral 
conformity, and in the cultural-cognitive pillar it comes from adopting a common frame of 
meaning or approach (Scott, 2001). Institutions exert pressure for compliance and adherence 
on organisations, groups and individuals. Different pressures are primarily associated with each 
pillar. Coercive pressure is largely associated with the regulatory institutional pillar and the 
enforcement of formal rules and laws. Normative pressure is associated with the normative 
pillar and demands to conform to societal expectations. Finally, mimetic pressure is related to 
the cultural-cognitive pillar, whereby organisations and individuals act in ways that reflect 
shared understandings and common beliefs, which are culturally supported. In this paper, 
institutional theory is deployed as the guiding theoretical framework. It is used to examine how 
institutions, and in particular conditions of institutional incongruence, may encourage informal 
economic activity in South-East Europe. Institutional theory was adopted reflecting the paper¶V
focus on understanding LQGLYLGXDOV¶HYHU\GD\experiences of informality and the institutional 
forces informing this. More specifically, a sociologically informed institutional lens is adopted, 
as this was considered to most allow for nuanced analysis of interactions between institutions 
and individuals at a micro level.  
Institutional incongruence 
Institutional incongruence exists when there is misalignment between what is considered 
OHJLWLPDWHE\DVRFLHW\¶VIRUPDOregulatory) institutions (e.g., its laws and regulations), and its 
informal (normative and cognitive) institutions (e.g., norms, values and beliefs). Institutional 
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incongruence has been the subject of increasing attention in informal economy scholarship (see 
for instance Godfrey, 2015; Webb et al 2009; Williams et al, 2015), where it has been deployed 
to explain the existence and persistence of the informal economy. Webb et al (2009: 495) for 
example, argue ³WKH LQIRUPDOHFRQRP\H[LVWVEHFDXVHRI WKH LQFRQJUXHQFHEHWZHHQZKDW LV
GHILQHGDVOHJLWLPDWHE\IRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´ Meanwhile, Williams and Horodnic 
(2016) examining institutional incongruence and informality across 28 European states, find a 
strong association between the degree of non-alignment of formal and informal institutions and 
participation in the informal economy.  
However, whilst institutional incongruence is increasingly utilised to explain informal 
economic activity at a macro national and cross national level, the dynamics of relationships 
between institutional incongruence and informal economy activity at a micro level, and how it 
is experienced by individuals remain less studied. There is also a dearth of finer-grained in-
depth analyses of the causes of institutional incongruence, and why individuals might engage 
in informal activity that is considered illegitimate by formal institutions, rules and regulations, 
but is normatively and cognitively legitimate. This paper sheds further light on these dynamics.  
The informal economy in South-East Europe                 
Our study draws upon focus group data from Bulgaria, Croatia and FYROM. Contributing to 
a growing body of work on informal economic activity in South-East Europe, including in 
Bulgaria (Goev, 2009), Croatia (.ODULü, 2011), and FYROM (Garvanlieva et al, 2012). 
Meanwhile, scholars have also engaged in some analysis at a regional level, and across 
countries, examining the wider nature of informal work (Williams and Horodnic, 2015), and 
informal purchasing (Littlewood et al, 2018), in South-East Europe. Yet, much of this work 
has been quantitative. We find no studies to date examining institutional incongruence and 
informal economic activity across a number of South-East European states, and especially at a 
micro level and at the depth it is considered in this paper. 
Tackling informal economic activity 
How governments can best tackle informal economic activity is the subject of increasing 
attention (see for example Barsoum, 2015; Mitrus, 2014; Williams and Horodnic, 2016). 
Williams (2014) provides a useful conceptual framework for classifying available policy 
measures for tackling the informal economy, identifying five potential overarching policy 
choices available to governments. These are: doing nothing, de-regulating informal work, 
eradicating the informal economy, moving informal work into the declared economy, and a 
mixed or hybrid approach contingent on the nature of the informal activity. Moreover, Williams 
(2014) goes on to distinguish between direct and indirect controls. Direct controls seek to 
establish compliant behaviour by ensuring the benefits of working in the declared economy 
outweigh the costs of working in the informal economy, with this accomplished through the 
use of deterrence measures (sticks) or making declared work more beneficial (carrots). Indirect 
controls focus on developing the µsocial contract¶ between the state and its citizens, by fostering 
a high trust high commitment culture.  
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Within a pan-European context, Williams and Horodnic (2016) provide an overarching 
examination of the relevance of a variety of policy options to tackle undeclared work. This 
includes an assessment of not only the validity of pursuing the conventional rational actor 
approach which seeks to increase the penalties of detection, but also the relevance of social 
actor approaches, and the possibility of combining both of these approaches. Their study also 
suggests a need for a deeper examination of causes, and why for example citizens may hold a 
negative attitude towards payment of taxes, or why working informally is normatively 
acceptable. The findings outlined in this paper contribute towards developing a more nuanced 
understanding of these dynamics at an individual level, which can in turn inform policy 
development. 
In this section, relevant literature has been reviewed and we have identified that an institutional 
perspective is adopted as the guiding framework for this research. We have also discussed what 
we know and do not know about the informal economy in South-East Europe, and how this 
paper contributes to knowledge. Finally, we have discussed work on tackling the informal 
economy, and highlighted the potential policy implications of our study. In the next section, 
we explain our research methodology. 
 
Methodology 
Focus group method 
This paper draws upon qualitative focus group research undertaken in 2016 in Bulgaria, Croatia 
and FYROM. Nine focus groups were carried out, three in each country involving a mix of 
³policytakers´ (after Brockmann et al, 2015). This included small business owners, managers, 
professionals, employees, students, retired people, and the unemployed. The eighty-three 
participants were of varied ages, included male and female representation, and covered 
multiple business sectors. All were drawn from urban areas, including but not exclusively from 
the capital cities of the respective countries, namely Skopje, Sofia and Zagreb. It is not 
suggested, and nor was it intended, that this sample was representative. Participants were 
selected based on maximum variation sampling to gain diverse insights on how institutional 
incongruence and informal activity is experienced by individuals in South-East Europe. For 
instance, experiences of and attitudes towards informality may be quite different between 
business owners versus their employees or the unemployed, or retired people compared with 
students. These groups experience the institutional environment differently. They also have 
varied life experiences, e.g. retirees who have lived through periods of socialist rule, conflict 
and economic transition, versus students who may have largely grown up in peaceful free 
market economies. The focus groups lasted between one and two hours.  
Prior to the focus groups, a small number of open-ended discussion questions were devised 
informed by previous research DQG WKH VWXG\¶V UHVHDUFK TXHVWLRQV. In developing these 
questions best practice in designing focus group questions was adopted (see Kruegar and 
Casey, 2009). The questions related to: participants understanding of the µLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\¶
including its boundaries (see Bagnasco 1990); their experiences of such activity; what 
motivated such activity, attitudes towards informal economy activity; the difficulties 
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government actors (i.e., inspectors) faced in tackling informal activity, and their effectiveness; 
and the perceived efficacy of different measures for addressing informal economic activity. 
Members of the research team would pose questions and then moderate discussions amongst 
participants. Generally, interventions were limited and focused on prompts to facilitate further 
deeper discussion, ensuring that discussions did not divert too significantly from the research 
topic area, and making sure that all participants were given the opportunity to express their 
views (Greenbaum, 1999; Kruegar and Casey, 2009).    
 
Data analysis 
The focus groups, which were recorded, were initially translated and transcribed. Members of 
the research team were fluent in the languages in which the focus groups were conducted 
ensuring accurate translation and transcription. All the focus group transcripts were then read 
and annotated with initial thoughts noted down and discussed amongst the team. One member 
of the research team then took the lead in identifying preliminary thematic codes. The focus 
groups from each country were analysed in turn. It was felt to be important to first analyse data 
from each country individually to gain a richer understanding of their specificities, before 
conducting cross-country (case) analysis (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Cross country 
analysis and comparison then occurred entailing a search for patterns and the identification of 
recurrent themes (Barbour, 2005), but also recognising areas in which data contradicted. In 
these latter instances, deeper probing was undertaken to explain differences (Frankland and 
Bloor, 1999). This more axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) process led to the 
identification of higher level, cross-country, thematic codes relating to RXUVWXG\¶V UHVHDUFK
questions. These higher-level codes were then reviewed by other members of the research team. 
Throughout, this analysis and coding process was highly iterative, and entailed repeated 
comparison with and tying of emerging findings and themes to the literature. During the coding 
we also remained cognisant of potential limitations associated with focus groups, for example 
group effects including self-censoring and conforming (Sim, 1998).  
Experiences of informality and institutional incongruence in South-East Europe 
It is estimated that the informal economy is equivalent to around 25% of &URDWLD¶VWRWDO*'3, 
and provides around a quarter of national employment (Schneider and Williams 2013). In 
Bulgaria, the informal economy equates to around a third of the national GDP (Murphy, 2012). 
Finally, in FYROM in a recent World Bank Enterprise Survey 55.6% of firms reported that 
they compete against firms operating informally. Informal economic activity is pervasive 
across all three countries. It is widely experienced by individuals and firms in the workplace 
and marketplace. Across the focus groups, participants identified this high prevalence of 
informality and its varied forms.  
The phenomenon of undeclared working was widely acknowledged in the focus groups, as 
illustrated in the quotations below:  
³I work with people who have no contracts, DQGPRVWRIWKHPGRQ¶WSD\IRUVRFLDOVHFXULW\
FRYHUDJH´. (Bulgaria focus group participant)  
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³7KHUHDUHPDQ\SHRSOHKDYLQJWZRMREVWKDWDUHZLOOLQJWRFRQFHDO LQFRPe from the 
second job «PDQ\UHO\RQPRRQOLJKWLQJWRVXSSOHPHQWWKHLUWDNH-KRPHSD\´(Croatia 
focus group participant)   
³Each employee is reported but some of them may be reported for half working time 
LQVWHDGRIIXOOWLPH´ (FYROM focus group participant)  
The above quotations describe varied practices of undeclared working including second 
³PRRQOLJKWLQJ´ jobs, jobs where not all contributions are paid, and jobs where work is only 
partially reported. In the latter instance of underreported working it is common for employees 
to be paid part of their wage µXQGHUWKHWDEOH¶LQDQHQYHORSH7KLVSKHQRPHQRQRIµHQYHORSH
ZDJHV¶ has been identified previously by Williams and Horodnic (2015), and was explicitly 
described in the focus groups:  
³All workers in the company are employed in that way, a part on the bank account, and 
DQRWKHUSDUWLQDQHQYHORSH´ (Croatian focus group participants) 
Related to this phenomenon of envelope wages, the cash economy was another widely 
discussed facet of undeclared working in South-East Europe, for example:    
³,ZRUNHGDWDVWRUHIRUSUHSDULQJKRPH-made meals, 8 or more hours a day, although 
we were registered as working for 4 hours a day. The rest of the money, we received in 
FDVK7KLVLVYHU\FRPPRQ´ and ³7KLVLVFRPPRQLQPDQXIDFWXULQJKDLUVW\OLQJSDLQWLQJ
ZDOOV«WKHWUDQVDFWLRQLVSDLGLQFDVK´ (FYROM focus group participants) 
The second of the above quotations describes how goods, and especially services, may be paid 
for informally with cash. Such experiences of informal transacting, including the avoidance of 
or misuse of receipts, were reported by additional focus group participants: 
³,KDYHKDGDVPDOOUHSDLULQP\DSDUWPHQWUHFHQWO\DQGWKHKDQG\PDQVDLGµThe price 
differs depending on whether you want a receipt or not´ (Croatia focus group participant) 
³7KHUH DUH PDQ\ PDUNHW WUDGHUV ZKR GR QRW LVVXH ILVFDO receipts or they give fiscal 
accounts ZULWWHQZLWKORZHUSULFH´ and ³,QP\YLHZLI\RXJRWRWKHSXEOLFPDUNHWVLQ
HYHU\VPDOOFLW\LQ0DFHGRQLD\RXZRQ¶WILQGDQ\RQHZKRKDVFDVKUHJLVWHUV´ (FYROM 
focus group participants) 
The focus groups also provided insights on business owners experiences of informal economic 
activity, who described facing ³XQIDLU FRPSHWLWLRQ´ from informal firms, those utilising 
undeclared work or not paying tax, as well as facing problems with non-payment by ³VKDG\´ 
informal firms. These issues and costs of informality to business are illustrated by the 
quotations below:      
³,W¶VKDUGEHFDXVHDIWHUZHILQLVKDMREPDQ\FOLHQWVWU\WRKLGHDQGUHIXVHWRSD\ « 
shady customers,´ and ³<RXSD\OHYDIRUWD[HVWKHJX\DFURVVIURP\RXSD\V
covers his employee on the minimum base rate, but pays a 1000 in cash. Your employee 
PLJKWGHFLGHWRPRYHRYHUWRKLP´ (Bulgaria focus group participants) 
In discussions so far, we have explored LQGLYLGXDOV¶experiences of informality across the three 
countries. We turn next to their experiences of institutional incongruence.  As explained in the 
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literature review institutional incongruence exists when there is misalignment between what is 
FRQVLGHUHG OHJLWLPDWH E\ D VRFLHW\¶V IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG LWV LQIRUPDO Lnstitutions. In the 
focus groups, it was evident that across the three countries there was significant social 
acceptability of informal economic activity. This acceptability is illustrated by the focus group 
quotations below: 
³Small-scale undeclared workers should be left alone. This type of work should be 
controlled, but left to exist´ (Croatian focus group participants) 
³I do not ask for receipt from them because mechanics do not earn much money, and it 
will be additional stress for them if they pay WD[HVIRUWKHLUZRUN´and ³If you go to a 
FHUWDLQKDLUGUHVVHUIRUPDQ\\HDUV6KHFDQ¶WNHHSWKHVWRUHRSHQFORVHVLWEXW\RXVWLOO
call her for her services at your house. I think it is ok. People are trying to survive´
(FYROM focus group participants) 
This seeming acceptability of informal economic activity can be contrasted with focus group 
participants generally negative perceptions of formal institutions and institutional actors across 
the three countries, which were distrusted and disidentified with, as illustrated by the focus 
group quotations below: 
³6XFKWKLQJVUXLQWKHFRQILGHQFHLQWKHVystem. Then a taxpayer thinks: Where did my 
money go? I pay taxes for what? «LQVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVFLWL]HQVGRQRWWUXVWWKHVWDWH
apparaWXV´ (Croatia focus group participant) 
³3ROLWLFLDQVDUHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIWKHSHRSOH%XWLQUHDOLW\WKH\DUHQ¶W´(FYROM focus 
group participant) 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHKDYHH[SORUHGLQGLYLGXDOV¶H[SHULHQFHVRILQIRUPDOLW\DQGRILQVWLWXWLRQDO
incongruence as manifested in an acceptance of informal economic activity and distrust and 
rejection of formal institutions and institutional actors. In the following section, we explore 
further individuals¶ motivations for informality, and both the role and causes of institutional 
incongruence within this.  
Causes of institutional incongruence in South-East Europe  
Individuals engage in informal economic activity for varied reasons. These reasons encompass 
drivers of ³H[LW´ (see Snyder, 2004) as well as ³H[FOXVLRQ´ and ³PDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ´ (see for 
example Barbour and Llanes, 2013; Cortes, 1997), which can also operate simultaneously, and 
are contingent on individual level factors (see Littlewood et al, 2017; Williams and Horodnic, 
2016). Across the focus groups, both exit and exclusion drivers of informality were discussed, 
for example: 
³7KHHPSOR\HURIIHUVµ<RXZLOOJHWPRUHLI\RXDUHQRWIXOO\UHJLVWHUHG¶DQGWKHZRUNHU
FRQVLGHUVDQGFRQFOXGHVµ0D\EH,QHHGFXUUHQWO\PRUHPRQH\¶DQGKHRUVKHDJUHHVD
lower registHUHGVDODU\DQGUHFHLYHVSDUWUHPXQHUDWLRQLQDQHQYHORSH´ (Croatian focus 
group participant - exit based drivers) 
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³(PSOR\HUVORRNIRUSHRSOHLQDµFKHFN-PDWH¶SRVLWLRQRQHVWKDWKDYHQRZKHUHWRJRWR
WXUQWR7KH\NQRZWKH\ZLOONHHSTXLHW´ (FYROM focus group participant ± exclusion 
based drivers)  
³7his is completely understandable given that most people in Croatia are forced to work 
iQIRUPDOO\LQRUGHUWRVXUYLYH7KHWHUPµEODFNZRUN¶VRXQGVTXLWHQHJDWLYHEXWORRNLQJ
through the lens of everyday life in Croatia it is nothing more than pure survival. Ok, it 
is not a survival strategy in every single case´(Croatian focus group participant ± mix 
of exit and exclusion drivers)  
Institutional incongruence provides the backdrop against which these drivers of exit and 
exclusion play out. Varied relationships exist between such drivers and institutional factors. 
For example, voluntary exit from the formal economy by individuals may be a logical response 
to state failure to enforce regulations. Meanwhile, the failures of institutional actors may result 
in or compound the exclusion/marginalisation of particular individuals pushing them into 
informality. However, whilst it is important to recognise the interaction between institutional 
factors and these drivers of exit and exclusion, in this paper we are especially interested in 
unpacking the phenomenon and causes of institutional incongruence, and how it drives 
informality in South-East Europe, and it is to this, which we now turn.  
We focus first on those factors undermining the legitimacy of formal institutions. Across the 
focus groups, a lack of trust and even active distrust of government institutional actors was 
widely expressed. This encompassed a lack of trust in their competence in using taxation 
revenues for national socio-economic development, but also a lack of trust and even active 
distrust of their motives, integrity and benevolence towards citizens (Mayer et al 1995). 
Problems of corruption, cronyism, misuse of public funds and offices for personal gain, were 
ZLGHO\UDLVHGLQWKHIRFXVJURXSVVXJJHVWLQJDEUHDNGRZQLQWKHµVRFLDOFRQWUDFW¶ (Godfrey 
2011) between the state and its citizens. This lack of vertical trust is illustrated by the following 
focus group quotations:  
[Participant @³7UXVW«7KHUHLVQRWUXVW´ [Participant @³([DFWO\,MXVWGRQ¶WWUXVW
the whole system. I would pay contributions on a higher base of 800 lv otherwise´ and 
³7KHUHLVDsaying; WKHILVKURWVIURPWKHKHDGGRZQ´ (Bulgaria focus group participants) 
³<RXVHHHYHU\PRQWKZKHQ,KDYHWRSD\9$7 .... I enter that number and always ask 
P\VHOI³:KHUHGRHVWKLVPRQH\JR"´<RXVLPSO\FOLFNWKHEXWWRQDQGLWIHHOVOike you 
threw it the garbage bin´ (Croatian focus group participant) 
In addition to an absence of trust in government actors, focus group participants also 
identified issues of incompetence and perceived unfairness in regulatory enforcement. It 
was widely regarded that enforcement agents lacked the tools to tackle modern forms of 
undeclared working and wider informal activity, and in this context, with the risk of 
detection low, it is unsurprising that individuals and firms would choose to engage in 
informal economic activity. This point is illustrated below: 
³7he National Revenue Agency continues to think that contemporary workers are like 
VHDPVWUHVVHVVLWWLQJDWWKHLUGHVNZDLWLQJWREHLQVSHFWHGDQGFDXJKW´ (Bulgaria focus 
group participant) 
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Secondly, a narrative of unfair enforcement was evident across the focus groups in all three 
countries, as evidenced in the focus group quotations below:    
³7KH\WHQGWRIRFXVRQWKHµVRIW¶ RUµHDV\¶WDUJHWV7KLVXVXDOO\PHDQVWDUJHWLQJUHJXODU
FLWL]HQVDQGVPDOOFRPSDQLHVZKHUHDVODUJHLQIOXHQWLDOFRPSDQLHVDUHOHIWXQSXQLVKHG´ 
(Bulgaria focus group participant) 
³7KHELJ IO\ZLOOPDNHDKROH LQ WKHVSLGHU¶VZHE WKHVPDOORQHZLOOJHWHDWHQE\ WKH
spider. I have remembered this and I think it applies´(FYROM focus group participant) 
In a context of perceived unfair enforcement, informal economic activity becomes more 
socially acceptable.  
An additional factor identified by focus group participants undermining the legitimacy of 
formal institutions included disidentification with ³HOLWHV´ in power, but also with the 
compliant. This was evident in focus group statements like: ³/RRNDW WKDW LGLRWSD\LQJKLV
WD[HV´ (Bulgaria focus group participant).  
Across the focus groups participants furthermore identified various wider µinstitutional 
LPSHUIHFWLRQV¶ (after Webb and Ireland, 2015), that would either force or encourage 
participation by individuals and firms in the informal economy. According to Webb and Ireland 
(2015) such µLPSHUIHFWLRQV¶ can take various forms including, institutional voids, institutional 
weaknesses, institutional inefficiencies and institutional instabilities. Policy failures are an 
example of institutional inefficiencies. Croatian participants for instance criticised public 
procurement systems and government funded workplace training programmes, whilst Bulgaria 
participants identified problems in social security provision and particularly pensions, in both 
instances it was suggested that due to these limitations, it was unsurprising that individuals 
would choose to work undeclared, especially young people. Relatively µIODW¶ tax systems in the 
three countries were also identified as perpetuating a sense of unfairness and encouraging 
informal activity. In FYROM, participants further highlighted rapid and repeated policy and 
legal changes (institutional instabilities) which made it difficult for firms and individuals to 
adhere to regulations even if they so wished. Other µinstitutional imperfections¶ identified 
included the suggested existence of ³ORRSKROHV´ (institutional voids) that permit firms and 
individuals to operate informally, whilst participants highlighted limits to civil society and 
trade union activity (institutional weaknesses) in protecting marginalised workers and holding 
government to account. The quotations below illustrate some of these institutional 
imperfections:  
³&LYLOVRFLHW\LVQRWDFWLYHHQRXJKSHRSOHDUHQRWLQFOXGHG« DQGWKHVWDWHGRHVQ¶WVHHP
WROLVWHQDWDOO´ (Bulgaria focus group participant) 
³+DYHQ¶W WKH *RYHUQPHQW EHHQ LQGXFLQJ VXFK EHKDYLRXU ZLWK µ:RUNSODFH WUDLQLQJ
ZLWKRXW HPSOR\PHQW¶ >$FWLYH /DERXU 0DUNHW 0HDVXUH@ , EHOLHYH WKDW WKLV PHDVXUH
motivates people to work on an undeclared basis. If one earns HRK 1600 or now HRK 
«WKLVLVQRWVXIILFLHQWWREX\HYHQDWLFNHWIRUSXEOLFWUDQVSRUWWRJHWWRWKHMRE2I
FRXUVHKHRUVKHZLOOJHWVRPHDGGLWLRQDODPRXQWLQDQHQYHORSH´(Croatian focus group 
participant) 
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 ³7KHUHDUHSHRSOHZKRKDYHIRXQGORRSKROHVLQWKHlaw; therefore they avoid paying. In 
WKDWZD\WKH\UHGXFHWKHLUH[SHQVHVDQGLQFUHDVHWKHLUSURILWV´ and ³ZKLFKSROLFLHVDQG
ODZV":HGRQ¶WNQRZWKHODZV,WLVYHU\EDGWKDWWKHODZVDUHFKDQJLQJYHU\IDVW7KDW
LVDELJSUREOHPLQWKHVRFLHW\´ (FYROM focus group participants) 
So far, discussions have focussed on how in South-East Europe, factors including a lack of 
trust, failures of enforcement, disidentification and wider institutional imperfections undermine 
the legitimacy of formal institutions and institutional actors. We turn next to informal 
institutions, the norms, values and beliefs through which engaging in informal economic 
activity comes to be viewed as socially acceptable, and which provide legitimacy to those 
engaging in such activity. In particular, we discuss how these develop, become widespread and 
persist in South-East European contexts.  
Across the focus groups, participants expressed significant normative acceptance of informal 
economic activity. For example, it was accepted that if a plumber or hairdresser came to your 
house that you would pay them in cash and be unlikely to get a receipt. Similarly, it was 
recognised that people might need, or choose, to have a second µPRRQOLJKWing¶ job or to be paid 
partially through µenvelope wages¶. Examining this further, in the focus groups from all three 
countries, participants identified the existence of an underlying attitude accepting or even 
encouraging non-compliance, described variably as a ³Croatian mind-VHW´, ³%XOJDULDQ
PHQWDOLW\´ or Macedonian ³FXVWRP´. Participants often suggested this was a long-standing 
historical tradition or something culturally embedded. Although, some also linked it to more 
recent historical developments in the three countries, and the legacies of authoritarian socialist 
rule and the transition to capitalism. These perspectives are illustrated in the focus group 
quotations below:  
³It is a part of Croatian mentality to always strive to evade taxes and contributions´ and 
³WKHUHZDVQR LQGLYLGXDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LQ WKHSUHYLRXV WLPH (socialist period). It was 
TXLWHQRUPDOWRWDNHVPDOOWKLQJVOLNHRIILFHHTXLSPHQWIURPWKHZRUNLQJSODFH´ (Croatian 
focus group participants) 
What is clear from the research is that current prevailing perceptions in South-East Europe 
where informal economic activity is normatively acceptable have developed over time, and 
accordingly tackling such activity and changing such perceptions will also take time.  
When focus group participants discussed the social acceptability of informal economic activity 
in South East Europe, they often indicated some form of normative (isomorphic) pressure at 
play. This is evident in the focus group quotations below: 
³[Participant 1]: taxi drivers for instance issue receipts rarely even though they should 
always do that: [Facilitator] : Do you ask them to issue one in such occasions? 
[Participant 1]: 1RWUHDOO\ODXJK« I have actually never UHTXHVWHGDUHFHLSWLQDWD[L´ 
(Bulgaria focus group participant) 
³[Facilitator]  What will happen to the person that reported their neighbour working on 
an undeclared basis? How would other people perceive the one who reported? 
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[Participant 3]  Traitor (everybody started laughing). [Participant 4]  I agree. (Croatia 
focus group participants) 
This normative pressure also manifested in how individuals discussed their social and 
reciprocal motivations for engaging in informal economic activity. For example, focus group 
participants often explained not asking for receipts or paying for services in cash on the basis 
that by doing so they were helping the individuals involved. For instance, one participant stated 
that they do not ask mechanics for receipts due to the ³DGGLWLRQDOVWUHVV´ paying tax would 
cause, whilst another was similarly happy for their hairdresser not to declare earnings due to 
her financial difficulties. Furthermore, it was suggested that such activity was often a reciprocal 
exchange of favours that was both normatively acceptable and something with which the 
government should not interfere.  
The previous discussions have argued that there is widespread normative acceptance of 
informal economic activity in South-East Europe, grounded in historical traditions and culture 
and maintained through normative pressures in society, as well as through norms of reciprocity 
and support for those in need. Building upon this, the focus groups also revealed significant 
cognitive habitual taken-for-granted-ness around engaging in informal economic activity. This 
manifest in statements like:  
³3ainting your apartment or something similar on an undeclared basis .... we are doing 
it from habit´and ³,EHOLHYHWKDWWKHPDMRULW\RISHRSOHKDYHD habit to pay in cash for 
small maintaining services ± OLNHUHSDLULQJWKHZDVKLQJPDFKLQH´ (Croatia focus group 
participants) 
Exploring this cognitive dimension further, we also see mimetic isomorphism at play whereby 
individuals act in ways that reflect shared understandings that are culturally supported. In this 
case looking to friends, family, neighbours, and even competitor firms, before mimicking them 
in engaging in informal activity on the basis that to do otherwise would be ³foolish´ or against 
their own interest, with such activity also culturally supported. This is illustrated by the focus 
group quotations below:    
³3HWHUGRHVQ¶WSD\,YDQGRHVQ¶WSD\DQG%ODJRGRHVQ¶WSD\EHFDXVHWKH\HLWKHUKDYHQR
money or there is no interest, why would I be the loser who pays? I would stop paying 
too´(Bulgaria focus group participant) 
³,WLVYHU\REYLRXVWKDWLIRXUFROOHDJXHVIULHQGVRUIDPLO\GRQRWSD\WD[HVWKDWZHZLOO
follow their example. No one is fool to be around that kind of people and to be the only 
RQHZKRZLOOSD\KLVGXHV´ (Macedonia focus group participant) 
Two final points in relation to how informal economic activity comes to be seen as legitimate, 
are processes of identification with those who engage in such activity, and how such activity 
may be justified as a form of resistance. In the case of the former, focus group participants 
across the three countries used SKUDVHV OLNH ³UHVRXUFHIXO´ and ³VDYY\´ to describe those 
engaging in informal activity, and even expressing admiration for those who cheat the system: 
³:HDUHsmart; ZHZLOOILQGVRPHZD\WRFKHDWVRPHKRZ´ (Bulgaria focus group participant). 
Whilst in relation to the latter, informal activity was justified and romanticised by some  
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Figure 1: institutional incongruence and informal economic activity framework 
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participants as a form of resistance to elites, unfairness and perceived failing institutions, for 
example: ³7KLV LV D ZD\ WR ILJKW DJDLQVW WKH FRUUXSWHG V\VWHP´ (Croatia focus group 
participants) 
In this section, we have shed light on the causes of institutional incongruence in South-East 
Europe. We have identified how formal institutional actors may lose legitimacy and fail in their 
regulatory role, and also how informal institutions, norms and beliefs, become established and 
entrenched, with this situation giving rise to informal economic activity. Key drivers of 
institutional incongruence, identified in our analysis and outlined in the preceding discussions, 
are summarised in Figure 1. These include those undermining the legitimacy of formal 
institutions: (1) lack of trust in the competence and integrity of formal institutions and actors; 
(2) perceived unfairness and incompetence in enforcement; (3) disidentification with formal 
institutional actors and compliant individuals; and (4) wider institutional imperfections. They 
also include those legitimising informal activity: (1) cultural norms and acceptance; (2) 
cognitive taken-for-grantedness of engaging in informal economic activity; (3) identification 
with non-compliant; (4) resistance to formal institutions and institutional actors. We would 
expect that as these drivers intensify institutional incongruence increases and with it informal 
economic activity. 
Before moving on to discuss the perspectives of policytakers towards measures to tackle 
informal economic activity, we would highlight two final points. First, the causes of 
institutional incongruence vary between countries, with different causes more or less significant 
in difference cases. For example, different institutional imperfections exist in Bulgaria, Croatia 
and FYROM. Secondly, whilst adopting an institutional perspective, we remain cognisant of 
individual agency. This is illustrated by the following quotation, ³,SD\ZKDWGR,FDUHDERXW
WKHRWKHUVWKH\FRXOGUHIXVHWRSD\LIWKH\GRQ¶WZDQWWR´. This is a reminder that ultimately 
individuals, and organisations, still possess a degree of choice in how they respond to 
institutional forces. Indeed, there remains scope for further enquiry into why some individuals 
in particular contexts choose to adhere to laws and regulations, pay taxes etc., whilst others 
facing largely the same circumstances and pressure subvert or avoid them.  
Tackling Institutional Incongruence and the Informal Economy 
In addition to shedding light on how informality and institutional incongruence are experienced 
by individuals in South-East Europe, and on the causes of such incongruence, our research also 
provides insights for efforts to tackle institutional incongruence and informal economic activity. 
The focus group participants were asked their opinions of varied µdirect¶ and µindirect¶ controls 
(Williams, 2014), on informal economic activity. This included discussion of the perceived 
efficacy of different control measures, as well as any barriers to the successful implementation 
of such measures.  
Turning first to direct controls, stronger support was found for the use of µFDUURWV¶ (including 
measures like simplifying compliance, providing support and advice to start-ups, offering tax 
incentives, and both supply side incentives e.g. amnesties, voluntary disclosure etc. and demand 
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side incentives e.g. service vouchers), than µVWLFNV¶ such as increased penalties and improved 
detection. This support is reflected in participant statements like: 
³1R UHSUHVVLRQ UDWKHU VRPH LQFHQWLYHV 6RPHWKLQJ WKDW ZLOO VWLPXODWH WKH RIILFLDO
HFRQRP\DQGZRUNLQLW´ (Croatian focus group participant) 
Historically, governments in South-East Europe have focused on the use of µVWLFNV¶ and negative 
reinforcement to punish non-compliant (bad) behaviour (Williams and Horodnic, 2015), rather 
than incentives to reward compliant (good) behaviours. However, recently there have been 
some moves to engage more with incentive measures, and our findings support these 
developments.  
Nevertheless, amongst focus group participants, there remained scepticism regarding the ability 
of country governments to deploy direct controls, whether carrots or sticks, either effectively 
or fairly. This speaks to wider distrust in government, perceived systemic unfairness, and 
degrading of the social contract. It also shows the connection between direct and indirect 
controls, and that just improving detection and penalties, and/or only offering incentives, is 
unlikely to be sufficient to tackle pervasive informal economic activity. Indirect controls 
aim to reduce institutional incongruence either by changing formal or informal institutions. 
Formal institutions may be changed in various ways, including: moving towards more 
progressive systems of taxation; ensuring wider procedural fairness; distributing the benefits of 
taxation more equitably e.g. redistributive justice; improving procedural justice systems so that 
citizens feel they are being treated respectfully, responsibly and impartially; enhanced 
transparency and accountability of the state to citizens; and more direct democracy, including 
greater citizen inclusion and participation in budgeting. In the focus groups, indirect controls 
of various kinds, aimed at changing for the better formal institutions in the three countries, were 
largely regarded positively, as illustrated in the statements below: 
³,ZRXOGOLNHWRNQRZKRZWKHWD[UHYHQXHVKDYHEHHQVSHQW«,WKLQNWKDWSHRSOHZRXOG
OLNHWRNQRZ´ (Croatia focus group participant) 
³>Participant 2]  the tax system needs to change. Progressive taxation: the low-income 
people would pay the minimum, while high-income people would pay more than 10% ... 
[Participant 9@1RPRUHIORJJLQJDGHDGKRUVH´ (Bulgaria focus group participants) 
Indirect controls, and measures aimed at changing informal institutions, were also discussed in 
the focus groups. Examples of such measures include tax education, normative appeals, 
awareness raising of the benefits of declaring working, wider information campaigns, political 
and societal leadership, and receipt lotteries to change expectations about giving and receiving 
receipts. Whilst participants generally perceived the need to challenge prevailing norms and 
beliefs that informal activity was acceptable, their views on different measures were mixed. 
For example, many participants expressed doubts about campaigns highlighting what public 
money is spent on, such as µthis school was built by taxes paid to country government X¶, 
eliciting comments like: 
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³I find it really stupid. They want to prove that they did something! Of course, this was 
a minimum they should have done [i.e. building roads, buying police cars...]  « such 
PHVVDJHVZRXOGKDYHDFRXQWHUHIIHFWLQP\FDVH´ (Croatian focus group participant) 
Further concerns identified were the potential for politicisation, or as one participant stated, 
³WKHJRYHUQPHQWLVPDUNHWLQJLWVHYHU\GD\ZRUN´, also for deception, and the value for money 
of such measures. 
The receipt lottery was similarly hotly debated. Some participants viewed it as a positive 
measure whilst others saw little value in it: 
³,PXVWDGPLWWKDWP\SHUFHSWLRQDQGDWWLWXGHVKDYHchanged in this respect. Now I expect 
WR JHW D UHFHLSW E\ GHIDXOW ZKLFK ZDV QRW WKH FDVH EHIRUH´ and ³, EHOLHYH WKDW WKLV
SURJUDPPHLVXVHOHVV´ (Croatia focus group participants) 
Interestingly, it was suggested that because of the lottery, people might become more active in 
asking for receipts from strangers but still not from people they know, their friends and family. 
Some participants also suggested that whilst they participated in the receipt lottery they ensured 
that, any receipts sent in were legal ³VR DV QRW WR KDUP DQ\ERG\´. Overall, focus groups 
participants were somewhat sceptical of current indirect measures to change informal 
institutions, this suggests that further thought and refinement by policy makers is perhaps 
needed.  
Finally, across the focus groups, participants often expressed a need for radical whole system 
change and the adoption of a multipronged strategy to tackle informal activity. This is 
illustrated by the quotations below, and aligns with the identification in the literature of the 
informal economy as a µZLFNHGSUREOHP¶ (Williams, 2014): 
³Those are individual schemes, but one should try with 56 different measures to yield 
success. I really believe that it is impossible to be successful with only one measure´and 
³WKHUHLVDQHHGWRIL[WKHZKROHV\VWHP´ (Croatia focus group participants) 
This section has provided insights on how institutional incongruence and informal economic 
activity can and are being tackled (Figure 2 provides a summary representation of these). In 
particular, it provides a bottom up µpolicytaker¶ perspective towards these measures.      
Conclusions             
In this paper, we advance understanding of institutional incongruence as an explanation for 
informal economic activity. We provide rich insights on how informal economic activity, 
institutional incongruence, and relationships between them are experienced by individuals in 
South-East Europe. We also shed light on the causes of institutional incongruence, identifying 
factors at work undermining the legitimacy of formal institutions and institutional actors in 
South-East European settings; as well factors contributing to the emergence and entrenchment 
of normative and cognitive institutions that legitimise engaging in informal economic activity. 
Finally, we provide insights for policymakers through examining the perceptions of 
policytakers towards different measures to tackle informal economic activity and address 
institutional incongruence.   
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Figure 2: Summary of measures to tackle institutional incongruence and informal economic activity 
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We outline a more nuanced understanding of relationships between institutional incongruence 
and informal activity. To date, much institutional incongruence scholarship has been 
quantitative, with less written at a micro everyday level and in terms of the lived experiences 
of individuals. We have thus responded to calls for more fine-grained perspectives on this 
subject (Webb et al, 2013), and for the use of alternative methodologies. Our findings also add 
richness and depth to previous debates in this area, including introducing a framework 
explaining the causes of institutional incongruence and how this leads to informal activity. To 
date, institutional incongruence studies have also often been focused on a single country. In this 
research, data was gathered from three countries providing a more comprehensive picture of 
how relationships between institutional incongruence and informal activity play out across 
different countries and the wider South-East Europe region. This paper also has implications 
for policy, providing insights on how different measures to tackle informal economic activity 
and institutional incongruence are perceived by policytakers in South-East Europe, identifying 
measures considered to have the most potential, as well as issues of concern. This complements 
studies of policy approaches towards tackling undeclared work at the pan-European level (see 
Williams and Horodnic, 2016).  
We identify a number of areas for further study. Firstly, scholars are encouraged to continue to 
utilise different innovative methodologies to examine informal economy phenomena, including 
its relationships with institutional incongruence. Secondly, whilst in this paper we have utilised 
institutional theory as our theoretical framework, we recognise that deeper engagement with 
identification theories, trust based theories, and social contract theory amongst others, would 
all be beneficial in extending our work, and provide further insights on why people engage in 
informal activity. Geographically, our work only draws upon data from three South-East 
European countries, so in a regional context there is scope to extend it to other South-East 
European states to assess whether our findings hold true. There is also scope to compare our 
findings with other regions across Europe and globally.  
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